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2019 Australasian Association for Logic Meeting

July 12

The 2019 Australasian Association for Logic Meeting will be held July 12, directly after the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference.

Schedule
Schedule | Friday July 12 2019
Time Talk
8.45 -9.15 Registration
9.15 -10.00 Shawn Standefer, A substructural approach to explicit modal logic
10.00 – 10.45 Ben Blumson, Relevance and Verification
10.45 – 11.15 Tea, coffee
11-15 – 12.00 Marcia Pinheiro, Nothing but Allurement: The Monty Hall Problem
12.00 -12.45 Martin Bunder, BCI-Algebras and Related Logics
12.45 – 1.45 Lunch
1.45 – 2.30 Kai Tanter, A Note on Restricting Failures of Identity and Cut
2.30 – 3.15 Timo Eckhardt, Forgetting Positive Epistemic Formulas in a Multiagent Epistemic Logic
3.15 – 3.45 Tea, coffee
3.45 – 4.30 AAL AGM
5.30 – 7.30 AAL Conference Dinner at Ciao Cucina 56 Crown St Wollongong.
Call for papers
Papers can be on any topic in logic.

Authors should aim for a time of 45 minutes including discussion time.

Submissions in the form of an abstract of approximately 200 words should be made to mbunder@uow.edu.au by 28 June 2019.

Registration and accommodation

Conference Registration (on arrival)

$30

Accommodation

Visit our Wollongong accommodation listing or Google Wollongong Accommodation. Wollongong or North Wollongong accommodation will be near the free bus route.

Visit Wollongong accommodation listing

Transport

How to get to Wollongong

How to get around Wollongong (including the free bus to University of Wollongong)

Abstracts
Martin Bunder, BCI-Algebras and Related Logics

Mathematics and Applied Statistics, University of Wollongong | mbunder@uow.edu.au

Kabzinski in [6] first introduced an extension of BCI-logic that is isomorphic to BCI-algebras. Kashima and Komori in [7] gave a Gentzen-style sequent calculus version of this logic as well as another sequent calculus which they proved to be equivalent. The second they used to prove decidability of the word problem for BCI- algebras. The decidability proof relies on cut elimination for the second system, this paper provides a fuller and simpler proof of this. Also supplied is a new decidability proof and proof-finding algorithm for their second extension of BCI-logic and so for BCI-algebras.


Timo Eckhardt, Forgetting Positive Epistemic Formulas in a Multiagent Epistemic Logic

University Of Melbourne | Teckhardt@student.unimelb.edu.au

In this paper, I provide a generalised formal account of forgetting that allows for more than simply forgetting boolean formulas. In order to do so, I present a system that generalises Fernandez-Duque et al.’s framework of forgetting [1] in two ways: By allowing for multiple agents and by being able to handle `positive epistemic’ formulas, i.e. those that do not include negations of knowledge statements. It will be based on the minimal impact approach that preserves as much knowledge of an agent as possible while the knowledge of the forgotten formula is lost. I introduce an operator [y]A that represents the result of agents A forgetting , i.e. \ after some agents A forget that ”. Finally, I show that the operation is successful, i.e. that after A forget , they in fact no longer know .

References

1. David Fernandez-Duque, Angel Nepomuceno-Fernandez, Enrique Sarrion-Morillo, Fernando Soler-Toscano, and Fernando R. Velazquez-Quesada. Forgetting complex propositions. CoRR, 2015.


Ben Blumson, Relevance and Verification
Department of Philosophy National University of Singapore
According to Ayer’s first empiricist criterion of meaning: “… we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition … that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone.” Ayer’s criterion is supposed to distinguish nonsense, on the one hand, from genuine factual propositions and tautologies, on the other. But if deducibility is interpreted in terms of classical logic, Ayer’s criterion is well known to be trivial — it entails that every statement is either a genuine factual proposition, or else a tautology. But in this paper, I show that if deducibility is interpreted in terms of relevant logic (in particular the relevant logic NR), then Ayer’s criteria escapes triviality.

Marcia Pinheiro, Nothing but Allurement: The Monty Hall Problem

Philosophy and Mathematics IICSE University | mrprofessional@yahoo.com

Professor Doctor Priest mentioned Monty Hall, and his famous TV show, where randomly selected people had to choose a door in three, then confirm or change their choice at a second moment, in a conference in 2000: the magic trick that proved that mathematicians had imperfect reasoning when laying the foundations of Combinatorics. Mathematicians responded: it is not the sight, but the eyes of the beholder of the vision; their eyes see only what they intend to see instead of what should be seen.

We discuss the analysis presented by Pinheiro in The Monty Hall Problem, a book from 2016, available at Amazon.com, and, with that, a ‘proof’ presented by Doctor Baumann in 2008. 

The intentions are convincing the public that Doctor Baumann’s proof contains a fallacy, and therefore Priest does not have a soundproof of his claim in this problem.


Shawn Standefer, A substructural approach to explicit modal logic

University of Melbourne

In this talk, I will present a class of ternary relational models for explicit modal logics. I will highlight a difficulty for proving completeness for these logics. Completeness can be proved by extending the language and the logic. I will then show how to accommodate some common extensions of the explicit modal logics in the present setting.


Kai Tanter, A Note on Restricting Failures of Identity and Cut

Monash University

In their recent article “Negation as Cancellation, Connexive Logic, and qLPm” Wansing & Skurt (2018) define a system qLPm that combines Priest’s minimally inconistent Logic of Paradox (LPm) with Malinowski’s q-entailment. Like q-entailment, qLPm is non-reflexive, however the combination with LPm results in failures of reflexivity being restricted to contradictions. In this talk I’ll look at extending this work to restricting failures of transitivity, as well as to the Liar and Curry sentences.

Details

Date:
July 12
Events Category:
Events Tags:

Organiser

Martin Bunder
Phone:
+61 2 4221 4151 | Building 39C Room 175
Email:
mbunder@uow.edu.au

Other

Location (Campus Map)
https://maps.uow.edu.au/app/1/home/106

Venue

Building 39C Room 174, University of Wollongong
HVVJ+2V
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522 Australia
+ Google Map